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This paper contrasts the determinants of entrepreneurial entry and high-growth aspiration 
entrepreneurship. Using the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) surveys for 42 countries 
over the period 1998-2005, we analyse how institutional environment and entrepreneurial 
characteristics affect individual decisions to become entrepreneurs and aspirations to set up 
high-growth ventures. We find that institutions exert different effects on entrepreneurial entry 
and on the individual choice to launch high-growth aspiration projects. In particular, a strong 
property rights system is important for high-growth aspiration entrepreneurship, but has less 
pronounced effects for entrepreneurial entry. The availability of finance and the fiscal burden 
matter for both. 
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In this paper, we contrast the determinants of individual decisions to 
become an entrepreneur and of aspirations to start up a high-growth business. 
We examine how various dimensions of the institutional environment, such as 
formal and informal financing, property rights and the degree of fiscalism, as well 
as the individual characteristics of entrepreneurs, such as their network capital 
and attitudes to risk,  determine both the entrepreneurial decision to create a new 
firm and the growth ambitions of the new entrepreneurs. Our framework 
generates hypotheses that distinguish between the factors leading people to 
choose between becoming entrepreneurs who remain self-employed or form 
micro-enterprises with few people employed, and factors leading them to aspire 
to create firms of significant scale, able to employ a larger number of workers in 
the future.
2 These factors include institutional features and the characteristics of 
the entrepreneurs themselves. We test our hypotheses using the Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) 1998-2005 surveys, which provide a large scale 
cross-country cross-individual dataset containing over 500,000 observations 
comprising 44 countries and at least 2,000 individuals in each country.  
Entrepreneurship is increasingly seen as a vital force in economic 
development (Baumol 1990; Wennekers and Thurik 1999; Audretsch and Thurik 
2004; Minniti et al. 2005; Minniti and Lévesque 2008). Entrepreneurs contribute 
to economic growth through generating, disseminating and applying innovative 
ideas; increasing competition and providing diversity among firms; enhancing 
economic efficiency and productivity (Cohen and Klepper 1992; Audretsch and 
Thurik 2004; Minniti et al. 2005). They are also an important engine for job 
creation, being responsible for anything from one-third to 70 per cent of job 
creation in the economy
3 (Birch 1987; Storey 1994; Kirchhoff 1994; Westhead 
                                                 
2 Hereafter, by high-growth aspiration entrepreneurial activity we mean nascent entrepreneurs (as 
defined in the GEM project, see Figure 1) who expect to create ten jobs or more in five years’ 
time. 
3 The mortality rate of new and small businesses is higher than for larger firms, so that job 
destruction figures for start-ups may be also high (Acs 1998; Aldrich 1999). However, even when 
controlled for this, the net effect remains positive (Autio 2005).  
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and Cowling 1995; Acs 1998; OECD 1998; Fölster 2000; Acs and Armington 
2004). To understand the determinants of entrepreneurship, entrepreneurs’ 
personal characteristics have been studied closely by researchers (Aidis et al. 
2007; Aidis et al. 2008a; Grilo and Thurik 2004; 2005; Grilo and Irigoyen 2005; 
Ardagna and Lusardi 2008). In this research along with socio-demographic 
characteristics of entrepreneurs such as age, gender, education and past working 
experience, the effects of entrepreneurial perceptions and attitudes has also 
been explored. Recent studies emphasize the impact of specific entrepreneurs’ 
traits, skills, and motivation factors, including goals, locus of control perceptions 
and self-efficacy (see for instance Harper 2003; Baum and Locke 2004).  
Recognising cross-country heterogeneity in entrepreneurship, a growing 
number of empirical studies have centred on the importance of institutional 
settings for entrepreneurship, using either aggregate cross country or individual 
data. In particular, sound property rights have been argued to be a significant 
basis for entrepreneurial activity (Johnson et al, 2002, Aidis et al, 2009). Informal 
financing is also considered to be an important driver of early-stage 
entrepreneurial activity (Bates 1997; Bygrave et al. 2003; Casser 2003; 
Huyghebaert 2001; Korosteleva and Mickiewicz 2008). Such research analyses 
either the determinants of cross-country prevalence rates of entrepreneurial 
activity (Van Stel et al. 2007), or focuses on explaining an individual’s decision to 
become an entrepreneur (Blanchflower and Oswald 1998, Blanchflower et al. 
2001; Grilo and Thurik 2005; Grilo and Iriguen 2006; Aidis et al. 2009), but 
seldom combine both individual level and country level determinants.  
A related literature focuses on the determinants of venture growth 
(Davidsson 1989; Baum et al. 2001; Becchetti and Vergata 2002; Baum and 
Locke 2004; Delmar et al. 2003), growth expectations (Wiklund et al. 2003; Aidis 
and Mickiewicz 2006) and the link between growth expectations and actual 
growth (Wiklund and Shepherd 2003; Aidis et al. 2008c). This provides strong 
support for the existence of a positive link between entrepreneurs' growth 
aspirations and actual growth, justifying the importance of studying aspirations; in 
particular when these are high-growth aspirations.  
However, only limited empirical research has been undertaken on what 
determines high-growth aspiration entrepreneurial activity. Terjesen and Szerb 
(2008) investigate determinants of growth aspirations in nascent, young and 4 
 
established businesses using cross-country GEM data. They find that while 
prevalence of entrepreneurial entry is high in developing economies, higher job 
growth aspirations are typical for developed countries.  Autio (2005, 2007) 
provides insights about cross-country and world regional patterns of a high-
growth aspiration entrepreneurial activity, its associations with national 
entrepreneurial environment, and individual characteristics of high-growth 
aspiration entrepreneurs, but falls short of providing testable implications 
regarding the determinants of high-growth aspiration entrepreneurship. Bowen 
and De Clercq (2008) analyse the impact of the institutional environment on the 
allocation of entrepreneurial effort toward high-growth activities. Their study is a 
pioneering work on how various institutional arrangements determine a high-
growth aspiration entrepreneurial activity, upon which we build. However, they 
use aggregate level data so their results may be subject to an endogeneity bias, 
given the possible reverse causality between the prevalence of high-growth 
entrepreneurship and institutional variables. Second, they estimate their models 
of high-growth aspiration entrepreneurship without reference to the decision to 
become an entrepreneur in the first place. In our study we address both issues. 
Overall, our contribution can be summarised as follows. First, our study 
attempts to distinguish which institutions matter the most for explaining, on one 
hand, entrepreneurial entry restricted to self-employment or micro-enterprises, 
and on the other hand,  the high-growth aspirations entry. In particular, we argue 
that more developed institutions enable more sophisticated forms of economic 
activity, namely high-growth aspiration entrepreneurship. Thus, for example, 
weak property rights do not necessarily hinder entrepreneurship, because 
informal arrangements and social networks may substitute for it, but high-growth 
aspiration entrepreneurship does benefit from more developed formal institutions. 
Second, we design our empirical models as a series of nested probit 
specification, which leads to robust estimates of both types of entry. Third, we 
use the GEM data set that contains rich individual-level information on 
entrepreneurs and combine it with information about country level institutional 
features. This addresses the potential endogeneity (simultaneity) bias noted 
above, because a country level variable cannot be affected by a single individual 
level characteristic. In particular, following North (1990) we take the property 
rights system as a fundamental characteristic of institutional quality. We find 5 
 
strong property rights to be of particular importance for individual decisions to 
choose high-growth aspiration entrepreneurship, whereas they tend to play a less 
pronounced role in explaining the decision to start a new micro-enterprise or self-
employment. 
 
  The paper proceeds as follows. The next section discusses theoretical 
issues pertaining to the determinants of entrepreneurs’ decision to set up high- 
growth aspiration ventures. Section 3 describes the data and the methodology. 
Empirical results follow in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 presents conclusions and 
policy implications. 
 
2.  Determinants of High-Growth Aspiration Entrepreneurship: Theory 
 
A well-functioning business environment is likely to provide incentives to 
entrepreneurs in pursuing market opportunities for setting up new ventures and 
generating new jobs (North 1990, 1994; Baumol 1990, 1993; Djankov et al. 2002; 
Davidsson and Henrekson 2002;  Harper 2003; Bowen and De Clercq 2008), 
while a weak institutional environment is an impediment to entrepreneurship 
(Johnson et al. 1999, 2000; McMillan and Woodruff 2002; Davidsson and 
Henrekson 2002; Aids et al. 2008). The quality of the institutional environment 
affects the allocation of entrepreneurial efforts among its various uses (Baumol 
1990, 1993, 2005) and the potential of new firms to generate jobs is likely to vary 
with the institutional context. 
  Personal traits, competencies, motivation and cognition have been 
increasingly advocated to distinguish entrepreneurs from other individuals and to 
explain entrepreneurial strategies (Parker 2004; Aidis et al. 2007; Aidis et al. 
2008a; Ardagna and Lusardi 2008; Korosteleva and Mickiewicz 2008).  Facing an 
uncertain environment where additional information can only be acquired at a 
higher cost, individuals tend to adopt alternative cognitive strategies (DellaVigna, 
2007). Cognitive factors, defined by Harper (2003:36) as the “individual’s agency 
beliefs,” affect entrepreneurial alertness to opportunities. More specifically, they 
comprise a “locus of control (or contingency expectations) and beliefs about self 
efficacy (or competence expectations)”  which imply that the more individuals are 6 
 
convinced that certain outcomes are dependent upon certain actions and the 
more they are confident about their skills and capabilities, the more they are alert 
to new opportunities. While the entrepreneurial locus of control is largely affected 
by the institutional environment, self-efficacy is dependent on individual 
characteristics of entrepreneurs, including their socio-economic backgrounds, 
attitudes and perceptions. More specifically, self-efficacy may be enhanced 
through the acquisition of certain skills and knowledge. Thus, Aidis and 
Mickiewicz (2006) find that entrepreneurs’ ‘learning by doing’ attributes, acquired 
through previous working experience or additional entrepreneurial experience, 
are positively related to growth aspirations. An increasing number of empirical 
studies examine the impact of entrepreneurial traits on venture growth (Baum 
and Locke 2004; Aidis and Mickiewicz 2006).  Baum and Locke (2004) find 
positive direct effects of goals, growth aspirations and self-efficacy for venture 
growth and indirect effects through interaction with other factors such as passion 
for work, tenacity and resource skill. 
We therefore expect not only institutional factors, but also entrepreneurs’ 
individual characteristics to play an important role in explaining high-growth 
aspiration entrepreneurial activity.  Our framework integrates institutional theory 
and the approach which stresses individual psychological traits of entrepreneurs 
and self-efficacy to study the choice of entrepreneurial strategies. Below we 
discuss each of these theoretical dimensions and postulate their likely importance 
for either or both entrepreneurship and high-growth aspiration entrepreneurship. 
Drawing on the theoretical literature (North 1990, 1994; Baumol 1990, 
1993; 2005) and the considerable body of empirical work discussed below we 
identify the three institutional dimensions which are likely to influence high-growth 
expectations entrepreneurship: (1) the protection of property rights; (2) the scale 
of the state as captured by the fiscal dimension; (3) the supply of finance (i.e. 
supply of formal finance and the prevalence of informal funding).  
 
2.1 Protection of Property Rights 
Strong property rights have been argued to exercise a fundamental 
positive effect on all economic activity. For entrepreneurship, it is important that 
the property rights guarantee the status quo and also include the ‘find and keep’ 
component, which is essential for the aspects of entrepreneurship related to 7 
 
discovery, innovation and creation of new resources (Harper 2003). Acemoglu 
and Johnson (2005) show that property rights institutions have pronounced 
effects on investment, financial development and long-run economic growth. 
Aidis’s et al. (2009) empirical account reveals that among various institutional 
indicators, the property rights system plays pivotal role in determining 
entrepreneurial activity, especially in developing countries. Johnson et al. (2002) 
provide evidence that weak property rights discourage entrepreneurs to reinvest 
their retained profits into business.  
While we expect that strong property rights are likely to encourage both 
entrepreneurial self-employment and micro-enterprise type of entry, we expect 
them to be particularly important for high-growth aspiration entrepreneurship. The 
latter implies both larger scale and (typically) more sophistication in economic 
activity; therefore, it tends to be more contract-intensive and to rely more on 
social contacts that go beyond the “family and friends” circle of trust.  In addition, 
larger ventures are subject to higher risk of expropriation where property rights 
are not protected against arbitrariness of administration. Thus while weak 
property rights may not discourage all entrepreneurial activity, they may 
discourage larger and more complex forms of entrepreneurship. 
 
  2.2 Size of the Government 
Secondly, we consider the impact of the state on entrepreneurial activity. 
In general, we would argue that a larger state sector will militate against 
entrepreneurial activity. Taxes and welfare provision may affect entrepreneurial 
entry via their direct impact on expected returns to entrepreneurial activity and its 
opportunity cost. High and increasing marginal level of taxes may weaken 
incentives for entrepreneurship by reducing potential gains. Moreover, a 
burdensome tax system (Batra et al. 2003; Aidis and Mickiewicz 2006),  and one 
that works against capital income and benefits debt financing relative to equity 
financing (Davidsson and Henrekson 2002), has been identified as restraining 
firm growth. Parallel to this, high levels of welfare support provide alternative 
sources of income and may therefore reduce the net expected return to 
entrepreneurship. Taken together, this implies that entrepreneurial activity may 
be inversely related to the size of the state sector. Moreover, the disincentive 
effects seem likely to impact disproportionally on high growth entrepreneurs.  8 
 
 
2.3 Finance  
Restrictions on the supply of finance have long been recognised as a 
major impediment to entrepreneurship (Stanworth and Gray 1991; Storey 1994; 
Beck et al. 2005; OECD 2006). Lack of credit history and shortage of collateral 
distinguish new firms from established ones and, given small scale of 
entrepreneurial projects, financial institutions find it costly to monitor small firms. 
The situation is aggravated by the perception that start-ups have higher risk of 
failure. Taken together, entrepreneur’s access to external finance is restricted 
and the cost of finance is raised (Huyghebaert and Gucht 2007, Korosteleva and 
Mickiewicz 2008), though, these constraints may be alleviated in more developed 
financial markets through the wider allocation of savings to potential investment 
projects and the facilitation of risk management (Levine 1997; Levine et al. 1999). 
Financial development is found to have significant and positive effects for 
entrepreneurial entry (Van Stel et al. 2007; Aidis et al. 2008a) and for firm 
financing and growth (Kumar et 2002; Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic 1998, 
Beck et al. 2005).  Moreover, a wider supply of finance is particularly beneficial 
for small firms compared to the larger ones (Becchetti and Trovato 2002; Beck et 
al. 2005; Grilo and Irigoyen 2006). 
However, start-ups use only moderate levels of formal external financing, 
typically relying disproportionally on their own equity and informal financing 
(Bates 1997; Bygrave 2003; Huyghebaert 2001). For new entrepreneurial 
projects, ‘internal governance’ structures based on personal trust within the social 
groupings based on family and local friends (Harper 2003) may be seen as 
superior to costly monitoring by formal financial institutions (see also: Korosteleva 
and Mickiewicz 2008). But, the scale of informal finance is limited and often 
insufficient for larger projects. Moreover, informal financiers may be reluctunt to 
concentrate their risk on small numbers of large projects. Accordingly, Bygrave 
(2003) argues that while informal financing is accessible to all entrepreneurs, 
formal finance plays a more significant role for ‘star’ firms, such as high-growth 
entrepreneurs, high-technology firms and export-oriented small firms. We 
therefore expect that informal financing will have more pronounced effects on 
self-employment and micro-enterprise type of entry than on high-growth 
aspiration entrepreneurship. In contrast, we expect the size of the formal financial 9 
 
system will be positively related to high-growth aspiration entrepreneurship, but 
less so to low-growth entrepreneurial entry. 
 
2.4 Network capital, experience and personal cognitive determinants 
of the entrepreneurial alertness 
Self-efficacy “arises from the cognitive appraisal of one’s capabilities”; it is 
important in explaining an individual’s alertness to entrepreneurial opportunities 
and may be enhanced by social learning (Harper 2003). Business networks are 
found to play an important role for entrepreneurs via social learning using role 
models (Minniti et al. 2005) and in assisting them to access resources for 
business creation (Aldrich et al. 1987; Djankov 2006; Nanda and Sorensen 2007; 
Aidis et al. 2008a; 2008b). Network capital also facilitates entrepreneurs’ access 
to finance (Aldrich et al 1987, Johannisson 2003) and is often regarded as an 
intangible asset that can be used to overcome difficulties arising from failure of 
formal institutions. 
For example, previous entrepreneurial experience can make subsequent 
entry more likely, because it enhances self-efficacy through the “direct mastery 
experience (learning by doing) and vicarious experience (learning by seeing)” 
(Harper 2003, p. 46). On the other hand, an existing business ownership implies 
that the opportunity cost of new involvement is high, and the latter would be 
chosen only if its expected net present value is significant, as is the case with 
high-growth aspiration projects. Hence we expect being an owner of an 
established business to be positively associated with high-growth aspiration 




3. Data and Methodology 
 
3.1 Sample Description 
In our study we utilize the data collected through the GEM adult population 
surveys in 1998-2005 that covers 44 countries worldwide
4. The data consists of 
                                                 
4 For countries included into the 1998-2005 datasets and year coverage see Reynolds (2005).  10 
 
representative samples of at least 2,000 individuals in each country. The samples 
are drawn from the working age population that allows avoiding the selectivity 
bias that often confounds other studies, which focus on the existing 
entrepreneurs only. GEM surveys were completed through phone calls and 
through face-to-face interviews in countries, where low density of the telephone 
network could create a bias. National datasets are harmonised across all 
countries included in the survey
5.  
The GEM data gives the opportunity to examine cross-national 
entrepreneurial activity, while capturing the widest possible range of business 
creation activities. Respectively, we can distinguish between (a) individuals who 
intend to create a new venture, (b) who are in the process of establishing a new 
firm (or start-ups, classified as nascent entrepreneurs)
6, (c) currently operating 
young firms (under 3.5 years)
7, and (d) other owners-managers of established 
businesses. For the purpose of this study we will focus on start-ups, and 
distinguish between high-growth aspiration and no-growth oriented ventures.  
The GEM dataset provides unique information on entrepreneurs’ personal 
characteristics, ranging from standard socio-demographic-economic 
characteristics to more specific entrepreneurial traits, perceptional and attitudinal 
variables. In the next sub-section we discuss variable definitions and 
measurements in more detail.   
   
                                                 
5 For more details of the sampling procedure see Reynolds et al. (2005, 2008). 
6 According to the GEM criteria, start-ups or nascent entrepreneurs are defined as individuals 
between 18-64 years old, showing some action towards setting up a new business whether fully 
or partly owned. They also must not yet have paid any wages or salaries for more than three 
months (for summary of this definition see Figure 1). 
7 These two categories constitute together total entrepreneurial activity (Reynolds et al. 2005). 11 
 
3.2 Variable definitions and measurement 
We utilise a set of various country-level measures of institutional 
environment along with individual-level variables. We can safely use aggregate-
level explanatory variables without being concerned about simultaneity bias: the 
individual decision of a potential entrepreneur should not affect country-level 
institutions or economic development. This gives us some comparative 
advantage over Bowen and De Clercq’s (2008) study, whose model may be 
subject to endogeneity bias. 
There is no universally accepted set of measures of institutional quality. So 
far, many scholars have largely relied on what is commonly referred to as 
institutional outcome variables (Glaser et al. 2004). These include survey 
indicators provided by the International Country Risk Guide (e.g. a measure of 
risk of expropriation), the World Bank measures of Governance effectiveness; the 
World Bank’s Doing Business indicators; and the Heritage Foundation / Wall 
Street Journal indices. In this study, we rely on the Heritage Foundation – Wall 
Street Journal ‘Economic Freedom’ Indicators, World Bank ‘World Development 
Indicators’, and the aggregate peer effects (prevalence rates) based on the GEM 
adult population survey, calculated by the authors. More specifically, we use the 
Heritage Foundation ‘Property Rights’ and ‘Fiscal Freedom” measures (see: 
Beach and Kane 2008)
8.  
The Heritage Foundation / Wall Street Journal index of property rights, has 
broad coverage and has been commonly used by other scholars (Acemoglu and 
Johnson 2005; Aidis et al. 2007). It shows the degree of protection of individuals’ 
private property rights by law on books and through its enforcement, and the 
extent to which private property is protected from expropriation (Beach and Kane 
2008). To achieve better distributional characteristics for our variables (which are 
bound from both below and above) we transform the original indices into odds.
9  
For the size of the government, we use the Heritage Foundation ‘Fiscal 
Freedom Index’ that is calculated on the basis of both the tax burden in terms of 
the tax rate on individual and corporate income and the overall amount of tax 
                                                 
8 World Bank Doing Business data is an obvious alternative, but it does not cover the time period 
of our study. 
9 For the transformation we use the following formula: [Index/(100-Index)]. The index implies that 
the stronger the property rights, the higher is the transformed indicator. 12 
 
revenue as a proportion of GDP (Beach and Kane 2008).  Again, we transform 
the variable into odds to improve its distributional characteristics. 
The availability of formal finance is defined as the ratio of domestic credit 
to private sector to GDP, obtained from the World Bank ‘World Development’ 
Indicators. This measure has been commonly used in previous studies (Klapper 
et al. 2006; Aidis et. al 2009).  To capture the supply of informal funding we 
introduce the prevalence rate of informal institutional investors, derived on the 
basis of our GEM data by taking the average percentage of respondents who 
invested in someone else’s start-up in the past three years in each country-year 
sub-sample. Finally, we use the GEM-defined variables to represent business 
ownership. We also capture social network effects by introducing a dummy 
variable which shows if the respondent knows other entrepreneurs.  
 
3.3 Control variables  
 
In addition to the institutional variables, the set of explanatory variables 
includes macroeconomic indicators and personal characteristics of 
entrepreneurs.   
 
3.3.1 Macroeconomic Development Indicators  
To capture the level of economic development and cyclical effects we 
introduce a measure of economic development proxied by per capita GDP (at 
purchasing power parity) and GDP annual growth rate (obtained from the World 
Bank World Development Indicators). The link between entrepreneurial activity 
and per capita GDP has been widely acknowledged (Carree et al. 2002, 
Wennekers et al. 2005). As per capita GDP increases, the rate of entrepreneurial 
activity falls and that may be explained by the emergence of economies of scale. 
As income stability can be provided by large domestic firms, many individuals 
prefer employment to self-employment at this stage
10. We expect a positive 
                                                 
10 However, entrepreneurial activity could surge again after passing a certain threshold in high-
income countries, being affected positively by the accumulation of individual savings and 
economic environment favourable to exploitation of new opportunities. In our specifications we 
also introduced per capita GDP squared to test this hypothesis of non-monotonicity, and we found 
some supporting evidence, however the model became overspecified andthe  Wald statistics 
difficult to obtain. 13 
 
relationship between per capita GDP and high-potential entrepreneurship, 
whereas it is likely to be negative for entrepreneurial entry, reflecting likely push 
effects in low income countries, consistent with Terjesen and Szerb (2009).  
We introduce the GDP annual growth rate variable to reflect a cyclical 
economic performance (see also Koellinger and Thurik 2009).  We expect that in 
a period of recession individuals are less likely to launch ambitious projects. We 
also include a set of various personal characteristics of entrepreneurs which are 
found to play an important role for entrepreneurial entry and their strategic 
choice.  
 
3.3.2 Human  capital 
  Previous GEM-based research shows that individuals with higher 
educational attainment are more likely to start a business (Minnitti et al. 2005b) 
and direct their efforts towards high-growth activities (Autio 2005). We use the 
GEM data on the age of individuals to construct two dummy variables, measuring 
first post-secondary and higher education jointly and second an incremental 
effect of higher education only. 
 
3.3.3 Other personal characteristics of entrepreneurs 
  A number of research studies confirm that such socio-demographic 
features of entrepreneurs as age, gender and work status are significant 
determinants of entrepreneurial entry. Previous GEM studies suggest that 
middle-aged persons are more likely to start a business (Reyonolds et al. 1999; 
Minnitti et al. 2005b).  
Entrepreneurial activity is found to vary significantly with gender. Being a 
male is more likely to drive up the rates of entrepreneurship (Minnitti et al. 2005a; 
Grilo and Thurik, 2005; Estrin and Mickiewicz, 2009). 
We also introduce a dummy variable for the individual experience of 
having been a business angel in the past and control for “fear of failure” (Ardagni 
and Lasardi, 2008). 
 
3.3.8  Dependent variables  
  We utilize four nested dependent variables, coded as dummies. The first, 
which identifies start-up activity as defined in Figure 1, enters our first equation. 14 
 
The second narrows down entrepreneurial entry to projects which are expected 
to create any incremental employment; that is, we exclude self-employment (38% 
of startup projects in our data). The third indicator relates to high-growth 
aspiration entrepreneurial entry with 1 denoting those who have intentions to 
launch high-growth oriented projects (expecting to create ten or more jobs). This 
represents 18% of all startups. Finally, to investigate robustness of our results, 
we narrow down our definition of high growth aspiration entry only to projects with 
expected employment of twenty people or more. This category represents 8% of 
all startups. 
 
{Figure 1 about here} 
 
  Tables 1-2 provide definitions of all explanatory and dependent variables 
respectively and report descriptive statistics. 
 
{Tables 1 and 2 about here} 
  
3.4 Methodology 
    
In our empirical investigation we do not separate the decision to enter from 
expectations related to employment creation by new projects but rather stress the 
simultaneous nature of both. This is reflected in the definition of the dependent 
variables outlined above. Moreover, the nested nature of these variables (each 
subsequent category is a subset of the previous one) enables us to estimate the 
determinants of each category of entrepreneurial entry separately, without 
concern for cross-equation correlation. This comes at a cost of efficiency of our 
estimations: separating the entry decision and the growth aspirations could lead 
to more significant estimates
11. In all our estimations we control for annual time 
                                                 
11 We also estimated  two stage probit-probit selection models but this was open to criticism on 
two grounds: First, the separation of the entry decision and growth expectations could be 
questioned as problematic, second, alternative choices of selection variables for the first (entry) 
equation were criticised. We therefore opt for the more conservative estimation strategy just 
outlined, though the two-stage model results were somewhat stronger. We also investigated the 
possibility of applying multiple probit, where both high-aspiration entrepreneurship and low-
aspiration entrepreneurship are pitched against inactivity (lack of entry). However, the results of 15 
 
effects. We experimented with the full set of country fixed effects, but the probit 
estimator collapses without producing credible Wald statistics. The country fixed 
effects problem arises because the GEM dataset is unbalanced with many 
countries appearing just once or twice over time. In addition, the introduction of 
fixed country effects while retaining institutional measures is highly problematic, 
as the cross sectional variation of the latter is washed out leaving only time-
variation which for institutional indicators constists predominantly of 
measurement error (as changes in institutions are often registered with random 
time lag and imprecisely). However, our reported standard errors are clustered on 
country-year groups allowing for within-group correlation. Without this correction, 
given the large number of observations, all our significance levels will look 
artificially much better. In addition, we also utilise information in the GEM dataset 
which attributes population-based weighting to each observation. All our 
estimations apply this weighting.
12 
 
4. Empirical Results and Discussion 
 
The correlation matrix for the institutional variables is presented in Table 3 




We find that while the Property Rights variable has no significant impact 
on entry in general, it emerges as the most important determinant of high-growth 
aspiration entrepreneurship. The positive and statistically significant impact of this 
indicator is robust, as confirmed by the results of alternative specifications (with 
either ten or twenty people threshold level of employment). The contrast between 
the results for entrepreneurial entry and for high-growth entrepreneurship may be 
explained by the fact that for low-scale ventures new entrepreneurs rely on 
informal institutions and localised trust to build self-efficacy necessary for 
successful entry. However, the larger-scale projects require more reliance on 
                                                                                                                                                  
Small-Hsiao tests rejected this model, indicating that there is strong interdependence in the three 
alternatives. 
12 We are grateful to Paul Reynolds for drawing our attention to this issue. 16 
 
formal, impersonal institutions and the stability they may offer. Therefore, weak 
property rights become a binding constraint for entrepreneurial development. 
Weak protection of property rights may also affect negatively the motivation of 
entrepreneurs to expand their businesses: they may start new ventures, but 
restrict themselves to small scale projects. 
In contrast with property rights, we find that the size of state sector affects 
both general entrepreneurial entry and high-growth entry negatively, but we 
detect no differential impact when comparing those two categories. Similarly, the 
size of the formal financial sector is conducive to both high-growth aspiration 
entrepreneurship and entrepreneurial entry in general. This result becomes more 
interesting when we consider the effects of the formal financial sector supply 
jointly with the prevalence of informal financing. The latter is found to play a far 
more significant role for general entrepreneurial entry. When we compare the 
marginal probit effects (as reported in Table 4), the impact of supply of informal 
finance on general entrepreneurial entry is ten times stronger that its impact on 
entry with ten or more jobs expected to be created. We interpret these results as 
an indication that the entrepreneurs with high growth ambitions are more likely to 
rely on formal external financing, given the larger scale of their projects. More 
generally, this contrast illustrates how informal institutions may to some extent 
substitute for defficient formal institutional environment: in particular social capital 
embeded in informal finance provided by friends and family supports 
entrepreneurial entry. However it is insufficient as a factor enhancing high-
powered projects.  
  Our study also confirms that there is some difference in the impact of 
being an owner of any other existing businesses between entrepreneurial entry 
and high-growth entrepreneurship. While being an owner of existing business has 
a negative effect on both entrepreneurial entry and on high-expectation entry, the 
marginal effect is about twenty five times weaker when we focus on entry with 
twenty or more jobs expected to be created. This suggests that entrepreneurs 
involved in current business are more likely to start new high-growth ventures 
than low-growth ventures. This relationship between high-growth aspiration 
entrepreneurship and ‘being an owner of established business’ may suggest the 
existence of some important learning effects resulting in serial entrepreneurship. 17 
 
Consistently with this, the effects of network capital are also captured through the 
variable representing the embeddedness in social networks as proxied by 
‘knowing other entrepreneurs’ variable. These effects are consistently significant 
across all specifications employed in this study. We also find that a greater self-
perceived risk aversion is likely to discourage both entrepreneurial entry and 
high-growth entrepreneurial activity. 
Other controls largely follow expectations. We find that per capita GDP is 
negatively related to both entrepreneurial entry and to ‘high growth’ projects. 
Impact of GDP growth is insignificant. The tax burden is negatively and 
statistically significantly associated with both entrepreneurial entry and with high-
growth aspiration entrepreneurship. This result is consistent with the view that 
high taxes and burdensome tax regulation are costly for small firms (Winiecki, 
2003).  
  The results also show interesting patterns in terms of entrepreneurs’ socio-
demographic and other individual characteristics. Age is related to 
entrepreneurial entry. The relationship between age and entrepreneurial entry is 
quadratic with the likelihood of entering entrepreneurship is rising up to the point 
when entrepreneurs reach their middle age, and falling after that. The previous 
studies also find that middle-aged are more likely to enter entrepreneurship 
(Reynolds et al. 1999; Minniti et al. 2005b).   Interestingly, while being in 
employment has positive impact both on entrepreneurial entry and on high-
growth aspiration entrepreneurship, the marginal effect in the latter case is much 
smaller. Similar effects relate to higher education. In contrast, while being male 
makes both entry and high-growth aspiration entrepreneurship more likely, the 
effect on the latter is far stronger. Marginal positive effect of being a male is about 
three to four times stronger with respect to high growth entry than with respect to 
general entry measure. 
Previous experience as business angel that can also serve as a proxy for 
accumulated own financial resources exerts positive effects on both 
entrepreneurial entry and on high-growth aspiration entrepreneurship, albeit the 
second seems weaker. Perceptional and attitudinal variables characterising 
entrepreneurs are also important for both entry and for high-growth aspiration 




The key message resulting from our findings is that more sophisticated 
institutions are correlated with more advanced forms of economic activity, 
represented in our case by high-growth aspiration entrepreneurship. The latter 
enhance efficiency and foster economic development. In particular, weak 
property rights do not prevent individuals from becoming entrepreneurs. 
However, they do discourage them from expanding their ventures and from hiring 
other people. Similarly, while informal finance plays important role for entry, it 
matters far less for high-powered entrepreneurial projects. 19 
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up a business, 
individually? 
Currently setting 
up a business, 
sponsored? 
Active in the past 12 months? 
Yes/DK Yes/DK
Owner or part-owner? 
Yes
Yes
Business paid wages etc. last 3 
months? 
Nascent entrepreneur: Involved in 
setting up a business 
     No 28 
 
  
Table 1a: Descriptive statistics and definitions of explanatory variables: 
    Business environment & macroeconomic variables 
 
Variable  Definition  Mean  S.D.  No of obs. 
Property  rights  ‘Property Rights’ index, 
transformed in odds 
[Index/(100-Index)]; higher 
value denotes stronger 
property rights (Heritage F.) 
6.22 3.60 589,579 
Fiscal freedom  ‘Fiscal  Freedom’  Index, 
transformed into odds 
[Index/(100-Index)]; higher 
value denotes higher fiscal 
burden (Heritage Foundation) 
1.82 1.50 551,376 
Formal finance 
as % of GDP 
Ratio of credit to private sector 
to GDP, prercentage (WB) 
110.6 46.77 602,287 
Informal finance 
prevalence  
Informal investors prevalence, 
percentage 
2.73 1.68 607,184 
GDP per capita  GDP per capita at purchasing 
power parity, constant at 2000 
$USD (World Bank) 
26,584.8 10,009.4  607,184 
GDP  growth  Annual GDP growth rate, 
percentage (World Bank)  
3.05 2.43 607,184 
 
Table 1b: Descriptive statistics and definitions of explanatory variables: 
    Personal Characteristics 
Age  The exact age of the 
respondent between 14 and 99 
at time of interview 
42.98 16.56 607,184 
Male 1=male,  zero  otherwise  .47  .50  607,181 
Employment  1=respondent is either in full or 
part time employment, 0 
otherwise 




1=respondent has a post 
secondary or higher education 
attainment, 0 otherwise 
.65 .48  562,431 
Higher 
education 
1=respondent has a higher 
education attainment 
.22 .41  562,431 
Current owner 
of business 
1=current owner/manager of 
business, 0 otherwise 
.05 .22  607,184 
Business angel   1=business angel in past three 
years, 0 otherwise 
.03 .16  605,793 
Fear of failure  1=respondent  belives  that  the 
fear of failure would not 
prevent him/her from starting a 
business 




entrepreneurs in past two 
years, zero otherwise 
.36 .48  465,480 
 
Source for Table 1b variables: GEM 1998-2005 consolidated dataset 29 
 
 




Definition  Mean  S.D.  No of obs 
Nascent 
entrepreneurship  
1=respondent is engaged in 
startup activity, zero otherwise 





1=respondent is engaged in 
startup activity expecting to 
employ other people in 5 years 
time or earlier, zero otherwise 





1= respondent is engaged in 
startup activity and expects to 
create 10 or more jobs in 5 
years time, zero otherwise 





1= respondent is engaged in 
startup activity and expects to 
create 20 or more jobs in 5 
years time, zero otherwise 
.003 .059  603,020 
 
Source: Variables constructed on the basis of GEM 1998-2005 
 



















1.00          
Fiscal burden 
 
-0.21 1.00         
Formal finance 
as % of GDP 
0.54 -0.21  1.00       
Informal finance 
prevalence 
-0.01 0.02  -0.12  1.00     
GDP  
per capita 
0.75 -0.30  0.61  -0.10 1.00   
GDP annual 
growth rate 
-0.17 0.23  -0.13  0.18 -0.19  1.00 
 
Source: GEM 1998-2005    30
Table 4:   Estimation results: probit marginal effects 
dependent  start‐up   start‐up excl. self‐empl.   startup 10 jobs or more   startup 20 jobs or more 
     Robust       Robust      Robust       Robust 
explanatory variables:  dF/dx   Std. Err.   dF/dx   Std. Err.   dF/dx   Std. Err.   dF/dx   Std. Err. 
age  0.001278  ***  0.000387   0.0008509  ***  0.000257   0.000149  *  0.000072   0.00003     0.00004 
age squared ‐ 0.00002  ***  0.000005   ‐ 0.000014  ***  0.000003   ‐ 0.6  **  0.000001   ‐ 0.000  +  0.00000 
male  0.01372  ***  0.000947   0.0112855  ***  0.000833   0.004332  ***  0.000305  0.002004  ***  0.000205 
in employment  0.007177  ***  0.002026   0.0055638  ***  0.001576   0.001399  ***  0.000354  0.000517  **  0.000176 
education: post‐sec&higher  0.007629  ***  0.001243   0.0053659  ***  0.00099   0.002441  ***  0.000397  0.001241  ***  0.000205 
higher education  0.004054  **  0.001389   0.0029988  ***  0.00084   0.001049  **  0.000379  0.000322  +  0.000178 
current owner of business ‐ 0.00567  ***  0.001694   ‐ 0.002876  *  0.001202   ‐ 0.00056     0.00041   ‐ 0.00027     0.000225 
business angel in last 3 y  0.033918  ***  0.002802  0.024323  ***  0.002185   0.008137  ***  0.001194   0.00446  ***  0.000852 
knows other entrepreneurs  0.033042  ***  0.002106   0.0234634  ***  0.001549   0.007552  ***  0.000633  0.003466  ***  0.000318 
no fear of failure ‐ 0.01581  ***  0.001021   ‐ 0.010617  ***  0.000712   ‐ 0.00323  ***  0.000273  ‐ 0.00155  ***  0.000172 
GDP per capita (ppp) ‐ 0.00000  ***  0.000000   ‐ 0.00000  ***  0.000000   ‐ 0.00000  ***  0.000000   ‐ 0.000  **  0.000000 
GDP annual growth rate ‐ 0.00022     0.000782   0.0001838     0.000627   0.000166     0.000183   0.00008     0.00009 
property rights  0.00037     0.000412   0.0000117     0.00028   0.000285  **  0.000093  0.000153  **  0.000055 
fiscal freedom  0.003338  ***  0.000633  0.002077  ***  0.000461   0.000561  ***  0.000129  0.000153  ***  0.00006 
credit to priv. sector /GDP  0.000106  **  0.000034   0.0000752  ***  0.000002   0.000016  *  0.000006   .00001  *  0.000003 
informal finance prevalence  0.344734  ***  0.060083   0.23331  ***  0.035875   0.034826  **  0.011932   0.0132  **  0.005922 
Number of observations  379131       376230       376230       376230    
Wald chi squared  3046.23  ***     2483.68  ***     1752.18  ***     1101.77  ***  
Pseudo R2  0.108       0.1124       0.12       0.1206    
Log pseudolikelihood ‐ 56783.9       ‐ 42867.6       ‐ 16716.8       ‐ 8946.02    
 
Notes:  ***
 significant at 0.001; **significant at 0.01; *significant at 0.05; +significant at 0.1; annual dummies included but not reported;  
robust standard errors clustered on country-years; estimations with GEM population-based weighting.  
 